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 Abstract 
Purpose. In this paper we explore whether temporary jobs are a port of entry into permanent 
employment and argue that the answer crucially depends on the type of temporary contracts 
being considered. 
Design/Methodology/Approach. We base our empirical evidence on a longitudinal sample of 
labour market entrants in Italy and estimate dynamic multinomial logit models with fixed 
effects to allow for the non-random sorting of workers into the different types of contracts. 
Findings. We show that the transition to permanent employment is more likely for individuals 
who hold any type of temporary contract than for the unemployed, thus broadly confirming 
the existence of port-of-entry effects. Yet, not all temporary contracts are the same. An order 
among non-standard contracts with respect to the probability of taking an open-ended job 
emerges, with training contracts at the top, freelance work at the bottom, and fixed-term 
contracts outperforming apprenticeships. Strong SSC rebates, lack of training requirements, 
and low legal constraints concerning renewals result in poor port-of-entry performance, as in 
the case of freelance contracts. Instead, mandatory training and more binding legal constraints 
on the use, extension, and renewals of training contracts tend to enhance the probability of 
getting a standard job. 
Originality/Value. Most of the existing empirical literature aggregates temporary contracts in 
a single category, thereby ignoring a relevant source of heterogeneity.  
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1. Introduction 
    The liberalisation of temporary contracts has been the main labour market policy in Europe during the last 
two decades, with the stated objective of increasing labour market flexibility. In many countries, temporary 
contracts make up the bulk of new hires; for instance, over 90% in Spain (Dolado et al., 2002) and over 50% 
in Italy. In 2009, the contracts of limited duration represented 14.1% of the employed workforce in the EU25 
(Eurostat data). 
    Several reasons explain these developments. From the employers’ perspective, the availability to offer 
temporary jobs is tantamount to a reduction in firing costs, which is particularly valuable in an environment 
with incomplete information and high employment protection for standard jobs (Bertola, 1990). Temporary 
jobs can be attractive from the labour supply standpoint, too − they may allow for a reduction of 
unemployment duration and contribute to a decline in the unemployment rates of the weakest segments of 
the labour force (e.g., Alonso-Borrego et al., 2005; Blanchard and Landier, 2002; Bover and Gomez, 2004; 
De Graaf-Zijl et al., 2004). However, all over Europe, temporary jobs are often associated with poorer labour 
conditions with respect to standard employment: lower wages, lower training, higher job insecurity, and 
lower protection from social security (e.g., Booth et al., 2002; Berton et al., 2009; Clark and Postel-Vinay, 
2009). Furthermore, concerns have been expressed that people in such flexible working arrangements may 
be trapped in precarious career paths, increasing the risks of social exclusion (e.g., D'Addio and Rosholm, 
2005). At the extreme, temporary jobs may simply provide disadvantaged unemployed individuals with a 
valuable momentary income-generating opportunity that does not significantly enhance their human capital, 
social network, and future employability, as in the case of the French temporary jobs considered by Magnac 
(2000). 
    Therefore, one of the main questions surrounding the introduction and liberalisation of temporary jobs is 
whether they ultimately represent a port of entry to open-ended jobs. We contribute to the existing empirical 
literature showing that the answer to this question crucially depends on the type of temporary contract being 
considered (e.g., fixed-term, training, apprenticeship, freelance). This is because the different contracts 
observed in practice are typically characterised by varying combinations of training, tax incentives for firms, 
and EPL provisions. However, most of the existing empirical literature aggregates temporary contracts in a 
single category, thereby ignoring a relevant source of heterogeneity.  
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    To support our points, we use a longitudinal matched employer-employee database drawn from the Work 
Histories Italian Panel (WHIP). This dataset has several advantages for studying empirically the port-of-
entry hypothesis, the most relevant of which are that we are able to observe the detailed labour market 
history of a large number of workers, including the contract they have been hired with, and to identify the 
employer. 
    To test the port-of-entry hypothesis, we estimate dynamic multinomial logit models with fixed effects to 
allow for non-random sorting of workers into the different types of contracts. These models aim to estimate 
how past employment status affects the chances of transiting toward any other status. Here the main 
econometric challenge is to disentangle the causal effect of past employment states from spurious selection 
due to unobserved individual characteristics. By allowing for individual fixed effects, our models are well 
placed for dealing with this challenge. In addition, the models turned out to be tractable, even when 
transitions between as many as seven labour market states were considered, which was crucial given our 
aims. While the Markovian assumption embedded in these models implies that the dynamics of the process is 
kept relatively simple, the crucial advantage is that the estimates of transition parameters are robust to any 
specification of the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity (Magnac, 2000). 
    Our main results are as follows. After controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, we show that the 
transition to permanent employment is more likely for individuals holding any type of temporary contracts 
than for the unemployed, thus broadly confirming the existence of port-of-entry effects. However, not all 
temporary contracts are the same. Training contracts are the best port of entry, while freelance contacts are 
the least conducive to transition to permanent employment. These results are found when estimating our 
models at both one- and two-year intervals, a robustness check we carry out to verify that the results are not 
driven by differences in the average duration of the various types of contracts. 
    Our paper is related to a number of recent empirical contributions testing the port-of-entry hypothesis of 
temporary contracts. Booth et al. (2002) for the UK, Hagen (2003) for Germany, and Addison and Surfield 
(2009) for the U.S. provide evidence in favour of the port-of-entry hypothesis; Hotchkiss (1999) and Autor 
and Houseman (2002) for the U.S., Güell and Petrongolo (2007) for Spain, De Graaf-Zijl et al. (2004) for the 
Netherlands, and Magnac (2000) for France instead find little evidence of port-of-entry effects. As for Italy, 
the evidence is mixed. Gagliarducci (2005) shows that the probability of obtaining an open-ended job grows 
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with the duration of the current spell of temporary employment but decreases with the number of past 
temporary spells. However, computational tractability requires that his analysis be confined to only three 
highly aggregated labour market states. The same aggregation is used by Picchio (2008), who finds evidence 
of port of entry in a different survey dataset. Ichino et al. (2008) instead focus on one specific type of 
temporary contracts − agency contracts − and find that this type acts as a port of entry in Tuscany but not in 
Sicily. By showing that the existence of the port-of-entry hypothesis is intimately linked to the type of 
temporary contracts being considered, our results intend to add to this strand of the literature. 
2. The theoretical framework 
    A number of reasons emerge in the literature to explain why temporary jobs may act as a port of entry into 
open-ended employment. Within the same firm, temporary jobs can be used as a screening device. Since 
ability cannot be perfectly observed, employers often decide to post temporary vacancies in order to screen 
the workers and to retain with an open-ended contract only the ones who proved to be more productive. To 
assess the relevance of a screening device argument, the analyst is required to have information relative to 
the length of the learning process about the firm-worker match quality so as to determine whether a worker's 
permanence in a given firm with a temporary contract is justified by a "normal" screening process. To the 
best of our knowledge, no such measure is available in the literature.i 
    Temporary work in one firm may also be a port of entry to open-ended employment in another firm. This 
is more likely to occur if temporary workers receive general-purpose training in their current job, as this 
would increase their human capital in comparison to that of unemployed individuals. Even if no training is 
provided, temporary jobs may allow the worker to build a network of contacts that in turn may increase 
open-ended employment opportunities. 
    However, temporary jobs may also become a trap. On one hand, when the mechanisms leading to the port 
of entry are not activated during a temporary contract, the latter will eventually result in either 
unemployment or successive spells of temporary work. This may lead to human capital depreciation and a 
deterioration of the prospects of getting a permanent job in the future, representing one case of the true 
"scarring effect" of temporary work. 
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    On the other hand, the literature points to individual heterogeneity as a mechanism sorting individuals into 
different contracts, thereby explaining some or all of the observed state dependence. Worker heterogeneity 
may be present in the budget constraint; i.e., some individuals searching in the labour market may face 
liquidity constraints. Despite possibly being high productivity workers, they may rationally choose a 
temporary job because more protected positions are not immediately available. Therefore, the individuals 
with more stringent budget constraints (those who need to earn wages as soon as possible) are sorted into 
fixed-term contracts (Alonso-Borrego et al., 2005; Berton and Garibaldi, 2006). In such cases, persistence in 
temporary contracts is due to a possibly unobservable (to the econometrician) confounding factor, and it 
should fade as soon as the constraint relaxes. 
    Persistence in temporary contracts may also arise as a result of employers' behaviour in the face of 
heterogeneity in the firm-worker match quality. As pointed out by Güell and Petrongolo (2007), even in the 
presence of perfectly observable worker types, firms may use temporary contracts simply because they are a 
cheaper and more flexible factor of production. In this case, firms trade lower labour costs with a higher quit 
rate and the risk of losing productive employees. Using a partial equilibrium search model, Güell and 
Petrongolo (2007) show that temporary contracts that are never converted could coexist with both early and 
late conversions. In particular, both a lower match productivity and less favourable workers' outside options, 
which make a worker's quit threat less credible, reduce the probability of conversion. 
    When individual ability is not perfectly observable by new prospective employers, there is also room for 
statistical discrimination (e.g., Phelps, 1972). At least three mechanisms may induce employers to believe 
that former temporary workers are less productive: i) on the previous job they received less training and had 
themselves a lower incentive to invest in human capital; ii) the previous employer hired them on a temporary 
arrangement just to face a demand upturn, but retention was unprofitable due to their low productivity; and 
iii) they failed the screening period proving to be of lower ability. Employers are therefore prone to offer 
them another temporary position. In this case, persistence in temporary jobs is not due to some individual 
characteristic, but to past temporary jobs themselves, leading to a second case of the true scarring effect. 
    As Dolado et al. (2002) point out, no theoretical approach available is currently able to contemplate all of 
these mechanisms at once; moreover, in the real world, they are likely to overlap. A fully structural model is 
beyond the scope of the present work; we instead estimate a reduced-form model, where we control for the 
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role of individual heterogeneity as well as possible. Any remaining effects will be interpreted in light of what 
has been discussed above. From this perspective, the possibility of observing transitions between different 
types of contracts (i.e., different mixtures of labour cost, EPL, and training) constitutes a crucial source of 
variation for disentangling the various mechanisms at work. 
Furthermore, a high probability to move from a temporary to an open-ended position within the same firm 
would support the hypothesis of temporary contracts as a screening device, provided that the length of the 
temporary contract is not exceedingly long. A transition from a temporary contract to an open-ended position 
held in a different firm could instead be interpreted as evidence for a more general port-of-entry hypothesis; 
e.g., temporary jobs allow workers to gain general-purpose human capital. Persistence in temporary jobs 
would be interpreted as a true scarring effect of past temporary work when emerging from transitions across 
firms; when emerging within the firm, it would support the idea of cost-reduction behaviour by the 
employers. Our dataset allows to observe transitions within and between firms, so that we can provide some 
hints on these effects as well. The point will be considered in the final section devoted to discussion and 
future research. 
3. The econometric strategy 
    We are interested in dynamic models in which a high number of labour market states can be taken into 
account, and it is possible to disentangle the effect of individual heterogeneity from the effect of past labour 
market experiences. In this respect, a trade off is faced when choosing the appropriate econometric model. 
On one hand, continuous-time models (e.g., the event-history analysis used by Bonnal et al., 1997) are in 
general more careful about the dynamics of the process and less on controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, 
which is often described as a random effect that multiplicatively enters a proportional hazard. On the other 
hand, multi-state models in discrete time allow the introduction of unobserved fixed effects, possibly 
correlated with other individual characteristics, and without the need to resort to distributional assumptions 
but at the cost of a poorer dynamic specification − usually, a Markov chain. Since our main concerns are 
related to flexibly controlling for unobserved heterogeneity while maintaining a high disaggregation of the 
labour market states, we follow the second strategy and use the approach proposed by Magnac (2000).ii 
 6 
    The model reads as follows. For each individual i ∈ {1,...,N} the latent propensity level 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
∗  to be in state j 
∈ {0,...,K} at time t ∈ {2,...,T} is a function of the lagged state variables and of unobserved heterogeneity 
𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡: 
                                                            𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
∗ = ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝑗1[𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝑘] + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  
𝐾
𝑘=0                                                                  (1) 
where 1[⋅] is an indicator function and 𝛿𝑘𝑗 are the parameters of interest. The unobserved components 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
are decomposed into an individual and state-specific effect 𝛼𝑖𝑗 and residuals 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡. Observed states are the 
states with maximum propensity 
                                                         𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑗   𝑖𝑓  𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
∗ = 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑙(𝑦𝑖𝑙𝑡
∗ )                                                                              (2) 
If the residual components 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡, conditional on 𝛼𝑖𝑗, are extreme-value distributed and independent across 
states, individuals and periods, the probability to be in state j at time t for individual i, given that she was in 
state k during the previous period, reads 
𝑃𝑟{𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑗 | 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝑘;  𝛼, 𝛿} =
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛿𝑘𝑗 − 𝛿𝑘0 + 𝛼𝑖𝑗 − 𝛼𝑖0)
1 + ∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛿𝑘𝑙 − 𝛿𝑘0 + 𝛼𝑖𝑙 − 𝛼𝑖0)𝑙≠0
                       (3)  
Identification of the state dependence parameters 𝛿𝑘𝑗 requires a normalisation constraint, namely to set to 
zero the parameters related to one of the destination states, here j=0. Therefore, 𝛼𝑖0 = 0 and 𝛿𝑘0 = 0, for any 
k. The interpretation of the 𝛿𝑘𝑗 is easier once the following ratio is considered, independent of the individual 
and state-specific effect 𝛼𝑖𝑗: 
𝑃𝑟{𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑗 | 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝑘;  𝛼, 𝛿}
𝑃𝑟{𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 0 | 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝑘;  𝛼, 𝛿}
𝑃𝑟{𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑗 | 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = 0;  𝛼, 𝛿}
𝑃𝑟{𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 0 | 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = 0;  𝛼, 𝛿}
= exp(𝛿𝑘𝑗 − 𝛿0𝑗)                                                 (4) 
The state parameters 𝛿𝑘𝑗 are identified once the additional normalisation 𝛿0𝑗 = 0, for any j, is imposed. The 
interpretation is as follows: if 𝛿𝑘𝑗 is positive, the odds of being in state j with respect to state 0 when the 
lagged state is k are larger than when the lagged state is 0.  
    Choosing "non-work" as the reference state, the estimated 𝛿𝑘𝑗 are informative of the nature of state 
dependence found in the data; i.e., whether a port-of-entry or a trap effect dominates for the different types of 
contracts considered. If a trap effect holds, the estimated transition parameters are larger when the lagged 
and the current states are equal than when they differ; i.e., 𝛿𝑘𝑘 > 𝛿𝑘𝑗, for any j≠k. In principle, this type of 
state dependence does not exclude a port-of-entry effect; i.e., 𝛿𝑘𝑗=1 > 0, where j=1 denotes open-ended 
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employment. In this case, the positive state parameter 𝛿𝑘𝑗=1 means that getting an open-ended contract as the 
destination state is easier if the current state is k (e.g., any of the temporary contracts) instead of non-work. 
Finally, 𝛿𝑘𝑗=1 > 𝛿ℎ𝑗=1 implies that contract k provides a better port of entry with respect to contract h. 
    Estimation uses a conditional maximum likelihood method (CML). As shown by Magnac, the individual 
likelihood contribution is 
𝑃𝑟{𝑦𝑖2, … , 𝑦𝑖𝑇−1 |  𝑦𝑖1, 𝑌𝑖1, … , 𝑌𝑖𝐾, 𝑦𝑖𝑇} =
𝑒𝑥𝑝 ∑ ∑ (∑ 1[𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑘] × 1[𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝑗] ×𝑡>1 𝛿𝑗𝑘)𝑗>0𝑘>0
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 ∑ ∑ (∑ 1[𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑘] × 1[𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝑗] ×𝑡>1 𝛿𝑗𝑘)𝑗>0𝑘>0𝐵
  (5) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑘 = ∑ 1[𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑘]
𝑇−1
𝑡=2  is the number of occurrences of state k for individual i from time 2 to T-1, and  
𝐵 = {𝑏 = (𝑦𝑖2, … , 𝑦𝑖𝑇−1) | ∀𝑘 > 0; ∑ 1[𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑘]
𝑇−1
𝑡=2 = 𝑌𝑖𝑘} is the set of all the possible state sequences that 
are compatible with the number of occurrences of each state. This method compares the work histories that 
are equivalent in terms of the number of occurrences but that differ for the sequence of the states. The 
variability between time 2 and T-1 is informative about the transitions among states; for this reason, stable 
histories do not enter the likelihood function, and at least four periods must be observed. As we explain 
below, our specification includes seven labour market states, and up to seven yearly observations are used in 
the analysis. 
    Three considerations are in order before applying this econometric approach to our case. First, the model 
is estimated conditionally on the first-observed employment status. Heterogeneity in initial endowments of 
human capital and ability is controlled for with individual fixed effects. Heterogeneity in previous work 
history is instead virtually eliminated by focusing on a sample of labour market entrants. 
    Second, the model proposed by Magnac works out the problem of unobserved heterogeneity in a very 
elegant way without incorporating any distributional assumption. Nonetheless, it's not able to take into 
account the effect of time-varying covariates. In other words, the state dependence we observe after 
controlling for fixed effects could be due to some individual characteristics that vary in the time interval we 
observe.iii One obvious candidate is human capital, which is expected to increase more in open-ended and in 
training contracts. However, no obvious candidates emerge once we control for the contract type and hence 
indirectly for the possibly different rate of accumulation of human capital. 
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    Finally, persistence within a contract can in fact be due to an ongoing screening process on the match 
quality instead of being due to a true scarring effect. Since in this case the main issue is the length of the 
screening period, one way to at least partially control for this is to look at transitions over increasing time 
intervals; we do this by estimating the model at one- and two-year intervals.  
4. The data 
    To perform our empirical analysis, we use WHIP, a large work histories dataset built up by LABORatorio  
Revelli from the Italian social security archives. This choice enables us to perform the following: 
 To observe many different contracts, whose characteristics are summarized in Table 1 and further 
discussed in the appendix.  
 To select a flow sample of entrants in employment and follow them for the first seven years of their 
working careers. Specifically, we select native people up to 30 years of age never observed in 
employment between 1985 and 1997 who start their first paid job during 1998, and we follow them until 
the end of 2004. We focus on a period in which the legislation on temporary contracts was quite 
constant, since the last two major reforms − laws 196/97 and 30/03 − were only just and not yet actually 
implemented, respectivelyiv. In this way, we minimise the potentially confounding effects of unobserved 
portions of workers’ careers − the pre-observation employment state is indeed non-employment for 
everybody – and of changes in the option set, in terms of work arrangements, available to workers and 
firmsv; 
 For dependent employees, to distinguish between contract transformation within the same firm and 
proper labour market transitions across different employers. 
 
    Notice that WHIP's reference population excludes only civil servants hired on an open-ended contract, 
high skill professionals (e.g., lawyers) and workers in the black economy, by definition. Hence, we exclude 
from the analysis those who work with a fixed-term contract in the public sector, as their transition to an 
open-ended contract in the same public sector would be unobservable. In this setting, absences from the 
archive can be easily labelled non-work spells, as transitions back and forth to unobserved contracts are 
extremely unlikelyvi. 
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    As our econometric approach models transitions across states as a Markov chain, we record the entry 
contract as well as the labour market position of the workers in October for every year from 1998 to 2004. 
Since identification requires a minimum of four observations for each individual, the series allows the 
estimation at one- as well as at two-year intervals. 
    
5. Descriptive evidence 
    We observe 5454 individuals aged 15 to 30 in 1998; about 46% of them are women. Table 2 details the 
entry contract in 1998: 31% of individuals start with an open-ended contract, 30% as apprentice, and shares 
between 7% and 13% are covered by the other contracts. Hence, more than 60% of the individuals start their 
labour market careers in temporary contracts.vii 
    Gender is a proxy for tastes and a relevant dimension of heterogeneity in general. Age at entry is a proxy 
for the initial endowment of ability and time spent looking for one’s first job. As Table 2 shows, differences 
by gender and age at entry are sizeable. Females are more likely than males to start their working career with 
a fixed-term or freelance contract. The modal age at entry is between 20 and 24 years. Younger workers (15-
19 years old) enter mainly as apprentices. Individuals starting with a fixed-term contract are younger than 
individuals starting with a training contract, while the other contracts (freelance ones in particular) are more 
often the entry contracts of more mature individuals. The share of open-ended contracts at entry increases 
markedly as age increases. 
    Table 3 shows average transition rates in the raw data. The panels contain transitions at one-, two-, four-, 
and six-year distances. In general, individuals move to the same contract they had, to an open-ended 
contract, or to non-work; all other transitions are quite rare. Persistence along the diagonal appears to be 
substantial. 
    Self-employees display the largest persistence, with levels fading down slowly at increasing intervals. 
Persistence is high for open-ended contract workers too, but this falls more rapidly. Open-ended contract 
workers exhibit a growing transition rate to non-work, confirming that open-ended contracts do not prevent 
the possibility of losing one’s job. Fixed-term workers and freelancers display lower and decreasing levels of 
persistence that nonetheless does not completely disappear at larger intervals. Both types of contracts suffer 
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from frequent exits to unemployment but enjoy increasing transition rates to open-ended employment. 
Training contracts have a legal maximum duration of 24 months and apprenticeships of 60 months; they both 
experience a growing transition rate to open-ended jobs and a low possibility of exit to other contracts. The 
degree of persistence in training contracts completely fades away at longer intervalsviii, while it declines less 
rapidly for apprentices. Persistence in non-work decreases over time, but it remains at 23% after six years. 
    Focusing on the last panel of the table, we can observe the six-year outcome of these career paths 
conditional on their status in October 1998, the year in which they entered employment for the first time. As 
mentioned, one out of four individuals is not working. However, those who had a freelance contract or an 
open-ended one in 1998 face the highest probabilities of being not working in 2004 (a further indication that 
Italian open-ended contracts are not so permanent). Almost one out of two is employed with an open-ended 
contract; those who started with a training contract enjoy the highest probability of working with an open-
ended contract in 2004 − even higher than those who started with an open-ended contract. In 2004, 8% are 
employed with a fixed-term contract; they entered more often with a fixed-term or with a freelance contract, 
or they were already out of work in October of the entry year. The self-employed face the highest persistence 
in the contract and the lowest probabilities of moving to anything else but freelance, even to an open-ended 
contract or non-work. This confirms that self-employment is a separate segment of the labour market, with 
little leakage to dependent employment. On the other hand, freelancers move to dependent employment 
much more often than "true" self-employees. 
6.     Econometric Results 
    In this section, we present our CML estimates of 𝛿𝑘𝑗 at 12- as well as at 24-month intervals. The estimates 
are arranged in tables that show, for each 𝛿𝑘𝑗, the origin state (k) by rows and the destination state (j) by 
columns. In other words, within each row, one reads the odds of taking different contracts, keeping the origin 
state constant; each column in turn displays the odds of taking one specific contract for different lagged 
conditions. Non-work is taken as the reference state. Therefore, positive (negative) figures mean that the 
odds of taking contract j with respect to non-work, when the lagged state is k, are larger (smaller) than when 
the lagged state is non-work. Thus, if 𝛿𝑘′𝑗 > 𝛿𝑘′′𝑗 the odds of taking contract j when the lagged state is k′ are 
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larger than when the lagged state is k′′. Similarly, if 𝛿𝑘𝑗′ > 𝛿𝑘𝑗′′ the odds of taking contract j′ when the 
lagged state is k are larger than the odds of taking contract j′′. 
    First, we compare our CML estimates of 𝛿𝑘𝑗, obtained after the individual fixed effects have been 
eliminated, with simpler estimates of 𝛿𝑘𝑗, call them 𝑑𝑘𝑗, obtained from a multinomial logit approach that 
only controls for the lagged state; i.e., without controlling for the individual fixed effects. The CML 
estimates of 𝛿𝑘𝑗 are reported in Table 5 for the one-year transitions and in Table 7 for the two-year 
transitions. The corresponding 𝑑𝑘𝑗 estimates are reported, respectively, in Tables 4 and 6. This comparison is 
informative about individual heterogeneity; as long as it plays a role in sorting workers among different 
contracts, we expect the state dependence coefficients to change after individual effects (𝛼𝑘𝑗) are controlled 
for. In particular, we expect the coefficients on the main diagonal to decrease, since the same individual 
characteristics that sort workers into one contract are likely to further retain them there. Our findings support 
this hypothesis: persistence decreases substantially after fixed effects are controlled for, as it is immediately 
clear upon comparing the main diagonals in Tables 5 and 7 and in Tables 4 and 6. 
 
Claim 1 Individual heterogeneity explains part of the observed persistence in the same contract. The effect is 
an overestimation. 
 
    Insights about the port-of-entry hypothesis are provided by the estimates reported under the column 
labelled "open-ended" in Tables 5 and 7. All the estimated 𝛿𝑘𝑗=1 are positive and significant, with the only 
exception of k = freelance at the two-year interval. Therefore, once individual fixed effects are controlled for, 
open-ended jobs are more easily accessible from employment than from non-employment. This is true for 
every contract of origin but freelance work, whose port-of-entry effect fades away before two years. An 
order among non-standard contracts with respect to the probability of taking an open-ended job emerges, 
with training contracts at the top, freelance work at the bottom, and fixed-term contracts outperforming 
apprenticeships. Training contracts display the highest coefficient both at one- and at two-year distance, 
possibly implying a positive effect of their formal training content – an effect not so evident for apprentices, 
probably due to their longer maximum duration (5 years). Notice that Magnac (2000) finds the opposite 
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result: in France, training programmes are not more effective than off-the-job search in finding an open-
ended position.ix 
 
Claim 2 The port-of-entry hypothesis holds; in particular, training contracts represent the best port of entry 
to open-ended employment, with freelance work the worst. 
 
    This notwithstanding, persistence is still far from fading away. Table 5 shows that, for any given contract, 
the most likely destination state is the same contract, even after fixed effects have been removed. At one-year 
distance, contract duration might play a role; training and apprenticeship contracts, whose maximum legal 
durations are two and five years, respectively, may be an example, but not freelancers or fixed-term contract 
workers, whose work relationships are shorter than one year on average. However, we expect persistence to 
decrease when computed at larger intervals. Table 7 shows that the coefficients on the main diagonal actually 
decrease, but are still the highest row-specific figures. Two aspects are worth comment: i) persistence in 
open-ended jobs falls dramatically at 24 months, confirming that open-ended contracts do not completely 
prevent workers from losing their current job, and ii) self-employment is more likely to be a permanent 
choice of the worker; this induces the high persistence and the low transition coefficients we see in the 
tables. 
 
Claim 3 Retaining the same contract is always the most likely destination, at one- as well as at two-year 
intervals, even after individual effects are controlled for. 
7. Discussion and Future research 
 
We can identify separately transitions of employees to the same or to a different firm. The fixed effects 
model cannot be applied here, as the transition matrix is not symmetric (transitions from non work to “same 
firm” are clearly impossible). Hence, we can analyse this aspect only in a simple descriptive way. Non the 
less it is worth discussing it, as it provides hints for future research as well as insights into the theoretical 
implications of these transitions, as discussed in section 2. 
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Table 8 presents such transitions, at both 12- (upper panel) and 24-month (lower panel) intervals.x As 
expected, the majority of open-ended contract employees is employed in the same firm 12 or 24 months later 
(mainly with the same contract: 58% and 77% at one-year distance for short- and long-elapsed tenure, 
respectively), although the share decreases the longer the interval considered (the previous figures become 
43% and 61%). Also, fixed-term contract workers show a high persistence within the same firm: 20% of 
those who have worked for a given firm for at least 24 months are observed again within the same firm after 
24 more months under a fixed-term contract (fifth column in the lower panel). This is an example of a "very 
long" (at least 48 months) screening process. A comparable share is observed within the same firm after 24 
more months with an open-ended contract (column three).  
    Training contracts can last up to 24 months within the same firm; if they are transformed into an open-
ended one before expiring, the firm retains the social security rebate until the original end of the training 
contract. Nonetheless, firms seem to wait for the end of the contract to eventually transform it into an open-
ended one. In fact, of those who have spent less than one year as trainees in a firm, more than half are still 
trainees in the same firm after 12 more months (column seven in the upper panel), while only 13% are still 
working there with an open-ended contract. After two years, nobody can be still a trainee in the same firm, 
and 48% of them are converted into an open-ended contract (lower panel, third column, shorter tenure); 
another 19% has moved to a different firm. Apprentices follow a similar pattern; i.e., the majority of them is 
still employed as apprentices in the same firm at one-year distance; about 19% of longer tenure apprentices 
are promoted to an open-ended contract instead; at two-year distance 25% of them is still an apprentice in the 
same firm, while about 31% have an open-ended contract within the same firm. For them, an open-ended 
contract with a different firm is a less likely event (10% of long tenure apprentices). 
    In conclusion, it seems that workers can face quite a long cursus honorum within the firm before obtaining 
an open-ended contract. However, the evidence depicted here mixes up the effects of heterogeneity, of 
genuine port of entry, and of true scarring. Further research is needed to apply a fixed effect model in this 
context, a methodology not available in the literature yet.  
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8. Conclusions 
    Are temporary jobs a port of entry toward more stable career patterns, or do they engender a trapping risk 
into precarious employment? Studying the transitions of an Italian sample of labour market entrants over a 
long time period, and controlling for workers' sorting across the different contracts due to unobserved 
heterogeneity, we have highlighted several aspects of this issue. 
    First, fixed-term jobs, apprenticeship, and training programmes act as a port of entry into open-ended 
employment, providing a significantly higher probability of obtaining such contract with respect to the one 
faced by non-working individuals, while freelance contracts don't. We have stressed how different 
combinations of EPL provisions, public subsidies, formal training contents, and legal bindings may provide 
firms with different incentives to retain workers under temporary contract arrangements as opposed to 
converting these jobs into open-ended positions. Strong SSC rebates, lack of training requirements, and low 
legal constraints concerning renewals result in poor port-of-entry performance, as in the case of freelance 
contracts. Instead, mandatory training and more binding legal constraints on the use, extension, and renewals 
of training contracts tend to enhance the probability of getting a standard job, as in the case of the training 
programmes. 
    Second, this port-of-entry effect coexists with a trap effect, meaning that, even if working is (almost) 
always better than not working in order to get an open-ended job, the most likely outcome of an employment 
spell is retaining the same contract. Persistence is therefore substantial too. 
    A joint interpretation of these two facts becomes easier once a third indication is taken into account. 
Descriptive evidence hints that both the port-of-entry and the trap effects can be accompanied by an internal 
cursus honorum effect; i.e., a long persistence with temporary contracts within the same firm possibly 
followed by an advancement to an open-ended contract. We interpret it as evidence of little general-purpose 
training received by temporary workers and of a cost-reduction strategy followed by the employers, who 
retain their employees under a flexible arrangement as long as they can and in any case well beyond a 
reasonable screening period. However, further research on this last point is needed. 
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9.     Appendix: Institutional framework and contracts 
Our analysis covers the years 1998 - 2004, i.e. the period immediately after the flexibilization of the Italian 
labour market was fully implemented. In fact, the period of analysis follows the Law 196/1997 ("Treu" law) 
that introduced agency contracts, reformed fixed term contracts and apprenticeship, promoted the diffusion 
of part-time jobs and training contracts and reintroduced probation contracts (tirocinio). Another type of 
flexible jobs, freelance work, had been introduced in the seventies, but strongly promoted only since 1996. 
The last year in the data is 2004, before another comprehensive reform, the Law 30/2003 ("Biagi" law), was 
actually implemented. So we focus on a period in which legislation on temporary contracts was quite 
constant (with the exception of a further liberalization of freelance and fixed-term contracts in 2001). 
    A brief discussion of the different features of the various contract types is in order. 
- Open-ended contracts have no stated duration, no training obligations and no social security rebates. 
They can be broken through individual or collective layoffs. Individual layoffs in Italy are allowed at no 
cost for just cause only.xi If a judge rules that the dismissal lacked the ground of just cause, larger firms 
(more than fifteen employees) are forced to re-hire the worker and to pay her a compensation; in smaller 
firms a severance payment is due.xii In larger firms layoffs occur mainly through collective dismissals, 
whose access is not difficult. 
- Fixed-term contracts were introduced in Italy in 1962 but never widely used; collective bargaining 
allowed their use more and more over the '90s and the 1997 law set an easier access to them for all firms 
by law; their almost complete liberalisation occurred in 2001. In fact, there is no maximum duration for 
fixed-term contracts and sequences of fixed term contracts within the same firm are allowed.xiii They 
provide for no training obligations and no social security rebates. 
- Agency contracts were introduced in 1997 and became effective in 1998. For this reason the share of 
agency workers in our sample - the flow of workers who entered the labour market on 1998 - is very 
small and we aggregate them to fixed-term workers. With agency contracts the provider hires the worker 
and sends her to the firm; the firm pays the wage to the worker (without reductions) and a search cost to 
the provider. They can last for a maximum of 24 months but are renewable within the same firm. They 
provide for no training obligations and no social security rebates.xiv 
- The training contract was introduced in 1984. It can last a maximum of 24 months and is not renewable 
within the same firm. Only individuals under 32 years of age can be hired with this contract. It provides 
to the firm from 25% to almost 100% rebate on the Social Security contributions; to the worker a 
minimum of formal training.xv 
- Apprenticeship was introduced in the early Fifties. Apprentices receive a minimum amount of external 
and on-the-job training and the employer enjoys a full Social Security contributions rebate. Its maximum 
duration is 5 years and is not renewable within the same firm. Only individuals under 24 years of age can 
be hired with this contract. 
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- Free-lancers are formally self-employed but in most cases their income depends on only one contractor 
and their tasks are equal to those performed by employees; they are often called quasi-subordinate 
workers or (wage and salary) independent contractors. No training has to be provided by the firm. Social 
security contributions are lower than those of dependent workers. When the contract was introduced in 
1996 it was for non-manual jobs only, but this limitation disappeared in 2001. Freelance contracts can be 
extended and repeated at will. 
- Self-employed workers observed in WHIP include all professional persons without an autonomous social 
security fund, as well as artisans and traders. Since they are proper self-employees, there's no room for 
questions about maximum duration, extensions and renewals. 
 
In general, the use of temporary contracts of any kind to substitute workers on strike is forbidden and 
sequences of temporary contracts face no limits provided the employer is different. 
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1: Main characteristics of the contracts 
Contract EPL Formal training Social Security Contribution 
Open-ended High No High 
Fixed-term Low No High 
Training Low Yes Low 
Apprenticeship Low Yes Very  low 
Freelance Null No Very low 
Self-employed Null No Low 
Note: see appendix for further details. 
 
 
Table 2: Entry contract in 1998. Distribution by gender and age at entry 
Entry contract All 
Gender Age at entry 
Males Females 15-19 20-24 25-30 
Open-ended 30.9 30.5 31.3 17.7 34.1 39.3 
Fixed-term 13.3 11.5 15.5 9.7 16.4 11.8 
Training 10.5 11.1 9.9 3.5 10.9 17.6 
Apprenticeship 29.7 32.0 27.0 65.0 24.3 1.3 
Freelance 6.8 5.2 8.7 2.2 5.8 13.6 
Self-employed 8.8 9.7 7.6 1.9 8.6 16.5 
       
Total 100.0 54.5 45.5 28.0 46.2 25.8 
Notes: column percentages; total: row percentages. 
Source: our computations on WHIP data 
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Table 3: Raw transition rates among contracts, at increasing time intervals 
Origin Destination 
One year Non work Open-ended Fixed-term Training Apprentice. Freelance Self-empl. 
Non work 60.7 14.1 7.6 3.3 8.2 2.3 3.8 
Open-ended 12.4 80.5 3.2 1.3 1.0 0.5 1.2 
Fixed-term 24.6 26.7 37.6 5.3 3.1 1.4 1.3 
Training 12.0 40.0 5.1 40.2 1.2 0.5 1.0 
Apprentice. 15.2 15.6 2.3 1.6 63.7 0.3 1.3 
Freelance 32.0 11.9 7.1 2.6 2.2 37.5 6.8 
Self-empl. 5.7 2.7 1.0 0.4 0.3 0.5 89.4 
Total 27.2 37.1 6.4 4.3 12.3 1.8 10.9 
Two years Non work Open-ended Fixed-term Training Apprentice. Freelance Self-empl. 
Non work 48.4 20.4 8.6 4.1 10.5 2.5 5.5 
Open-ended 16.3 72.6 4.5 1.9 1.7 0.7 2.4 
Fixed-term 25.3 34.7 25.2 6.0 4.9 1.9 2.2 
Training 15.7 69.9 4.7 5.8 1.3 0.5 2.2 
Apprentice. 17.4 28.8 3.5 3.0 43.7 0.6 3.1 
Freelance 38.6 17.3 6.7 4.4 3.8 19.6 9.6 
Self-empl. 8.8 5.2 1.6 0.6 0.4 0.8 82.6 
Total 26.3 39.9 6.6 3.2 11.1 1.7 11.3 
Four years Non work Open-ended Fixed-term Training Apprentice. Freelance Self-empl. 
Non work 33.9 31.4 9.8 3.0 10.9 2.6 8.5 
Open-ended 21.7 62.9 5.7 1.6 2.2 1.2 4.6 
Fixed-term 22.7 49.4 15.5 2.9 4.1 1.3 4.2 
Training 15.8 74.1 3.9 1.2 0.9 0.8 3.4 
Apprentice. 19.1 47.1 4.6 2.4 19.2 1.2 6.5 
Freelance 35.4 30.3 6.8 1.4 2.8 10.0 13.3 
Self-empl. 14.4 10.0 2.2 0.4 0.7 1.2 71.2 
Total 24.4 44.7 7.0 2.1 8.0 1.8 12.0 
Six years Non work Open-ended Fixed-term Training Apprentice. Freelance Self-empl. 
Non work 23.2 44.5 10.9 0.9 8.9 2.1 9.5 
Open-ended 29.3 52.8 6.6 0.9 1.9 1.4 7.1 
Fixed-term 20.9 55.5 10.4 2.3 2.8 1.7 6.5 
Training 19.3 69.5 3.5 0.4 0.6 1.2 5.5 
Apprentice. 21.6 50.2 6.3 1.3 11.4 0.9 8.3 
Freelance 36.0 35.1 8.4 0.5 1.4 5.1 13.6 
Self-empl. 16.8 11.5 2.0 0.3 0.5 1.8 67.1 
Total 23.7 47.6 7.7 1.0 5.9 1.7 12.5 
Note: row percentages 
Source: our computations on WHIP data 
 20 
Table 4: d(kj) estimates without individual fixed effects, one-year interval 
Origin Destination 
 Open-ended Fixed-term Training Apprenticeship Freelance Self-employed 
Open-ended 3.111 
(0.040) 
0.420 
(0.070) 
0.394 
(0.103) 
-0.571 
(0.095) 
-0.289 
(0.157) 
0.101 
(0.107) 
Fixed-term 1.041 
(0.062) 
2.332 
(0.061) 
0.988 
(0.112) 
-0.518 
(0.131) 
-0.064 
(0.198) 
-0.636 
(0.200) 
Training 2.234 
(0.072) 
0.803 
(0.123) 
4.138 
(0.084) 
-0.659 
(0.215) 
-0.353 
(0.345) 
-0.057 
(0.236) 
Apprenticeship 0.911 
(0.055) 
-0.330 
(0.104) 
0.120 
(0.128) 
3.127 
(0.050) 
-1.183 
(0.269) 
-0.251 
(0.140) 
Freelance 0.122 
(0.115) 
0.102 
(0.151) 
0.188 
(0.211) 
-0.977 
(0.232) 
3.410 
(0.098) 
0.799 
(0.155) 
Self-employed 0.484 
(0.127) 
0.126 
(0.187) 
-0.018 
(0.058) 
-1.089 
(0.311) 
1.751 
(0.168) 
5.401 
(0.086) 
Notes: standard errors in second rows; bold if 95% significant 
Source: our computations on WHIP data. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: δ(kj) estimates controlling for individual fixed effects, one-year interval 
Origin Destination 
 Open-ended Fixed-term Training Apprenticeship Freelance Self-employed 
Open-ended 2.576 
(0.069) 
0.563 
(0.098) 
0.014 
(0.139) 
-0.572 
(0.138) 
0.253 
(0.217) 
0.359 
(0.191) 
Fixed-term 1.229 
(0.097) 
1.786 
(0.105) 
1.018 
(0.170) 
0.030 
(0.186) 
0.545 
(0.260) 
0.103 
(0.312) 
Training 1.620 
(0.122) 
1.218 
(0.176) 
3.839 
(0.203) 
-0.133 
(0.283) 
0.640 
(0.434) 
0.295 
(0.348) 
Apprenticeship 0.679 
(0.095) 
0.099 
(0.155) 
0.328 
(0.210) 
2.284 
(0.095) 
-0.729 
(0.418) 
-0.305 
(0.273) 
Freelance 0.470 
(0.201) 
0.864 
(0.212) 
0.709 
(0.376) 
-0.101 
(0.414) 
2.282 
(0.198) 
1.176 
(0.287) 
Self-employed 0.464 
(0.233) 
0.575 
(0.320) 
0.076 
(0.446) 
-0.125 
(0.434) 
0.908 
(0.440) 
3.725 
(0.189) 
Notes: standard errors in second rows; bold if 95% significant 
Source: our computations on WHIP data. 
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Table 6: d(kj) estimates without individual fixed effects, two-year interval 
Origin Destination 
 Open-ended Fixed-term Training Apprenticeship Freelance Self-employed 
Open-ended 2.139 
(0.039) 
0.290 
(0.067) 
0.390 
(0.089) 
-0.703 
(0.083) 
-0.287 
(0.139) 
-0.012 
(0.088) 
Fixed-term 0.844 
(0.060) 
1.475 
(0.069) 
0.931 
(0.104) 
-0.285 
(0.105) 
0.020 
(0.179) 
-0.746 
(0.170) 
Training 2.150 
(0.066) 
0.413 
(0.122) 
2.675 
(0.091) 
-0.920 
(0.191) 
-0.439 
(0.302) 
0.113 
(0.164) 
Apprenticeship 0.851 
(0.049) 
-0.209 
(0.087) 
0.341 
(0.101) 
2.263 
(0.050) 
-0.907 
(0.204) 
-0.061 
(0.101) 
Freelance -0.084 
(0.100) 
-0.237 
(0.150) 
0.338 
(0.165) 
-0.920 
(0.183) 
2.399 
(0.110) 
0.495 
(0.136) 
Self-employed 0.299 
(0.107) 
-0.015 
(0.167) 
-0.144 
(0.244) 
-1.458 
(0.287) 
0.451 
(0.238) 
4.476 
(0.082) 
Notes: standard errors in second rows; bold if 95% significant 
Source: our computations on WHIP data. 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: δ(kj) estimates controlling for individual fixed effects, two-year interval 
Origin Destination 
 Open-ended Fixed-term Training Apprenticeship Freelance Self-employed 
Open-ended 1.734 
(0.137) 
0.462 
(0.182) 
-0.210 
(0.243) 
-0.501 
(0.222) 
-0.131 
(0.412) 
0.690 
(0.387) 
Fixed-term 0.775 
(0.179) 
1.654 
(0.239) 
0.703 
(0.339) 
0.636 
(0.338) 
1.228 
(0.555) 
-0.748 
(0.624) 
Training 1.405 
(0.204) 
0.771 
(0.323) 
2.169 
(0.538) 
0.005 
(0.447) 
-0.496 
(0.854) 
1.224 
(0.631) 
Apprenticeship 0.364 
(0.174) 
0.409 
(0.249) 
0.563 
(0.371) 
1.944 
(0.215) 
-0.886 
(0.178) 
-0.701 
(0.464) 
Freelance -0.075 
(0.366) 
0.848 
(0.408) 
0.970 
(0.749) 
0.160 
(0.748) 
1.542 
(0.448) 
1.217 
(0.558) 
Self-employed 1.093 
(0.462) 
0.558 
(0.639) 
0.883 
(0.883) 
-0.595 
(0.999) 
-0.218 
(1.205) 
3.952 
(0.524) 
Notes: standard errors in second rows; bold if 95% significant 
Source: our computations on WHIP data. 
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Table 8: Raw transition rates at one- and two-year intervals, to the same or to another firm 
Origin Destination 
1 year 
Non 
work 
Open-ended Fixed-term Training Apprenticeship 
Other Same Other Same Other Same Other Same 
Non work 60.7 14.1  7.6  3.3  8.2  
Open-ended 
< 12 months 19.3 12.0 58.2 3.9 0.7 1.6 0.7 1.4 0.4 
> 12 months 8.5 9.7 76.7 2.1 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.1 
Fixed-term 
< 12 months 26.9 11.8 14.4 13.1 21.5 3.4 2.8 2.7 0.6 
> 12 months 17.6 10.2 18.0 8.6 38.6 1.0 1.2 2.2 0.6 
Training 
< 12 months 11.6 6.7 13.4 2.9 2.9 5.5 53.1 1.6 0.1 
> 12 months 12.6 10.7 60.8 1.8 2.1 1.8 9.1 0.3 0.1 
Apprenticeship 
< 12 months 19.0 4.8 2.4 2.4 0.2 1.6 0.1 10.3 58.2 
> 12 months 11.7 4.8 18.6 1.7 0.2 1.3 0.1 5.9 53.5 
Total 28.0 11.5 23.3 4.8 1.6 3.0 2.0 6.3 7.1 
2 years 
Non 
work 
Open-ended Fixed-term Training Apprenticeship 
Other Same Other Same Other Same Other Same 
Non work 48.4 20.4  8.6  4.1 
(notes) 
10.5  
Open-ended 
< 24 months 21.8 20.6 43.3 5.6 0.4 2.6 2.2 0.4 
> 24 months 12.5 17.2 61.4 3.0 0.3 1.1 0.9 0.1 
Fixed-term 
< 24 months 26.1 18.8 15.7 13.0 11.2 4.7 4.7 0.4 
> 24 months 22.5 15.1 20.2 9.1 19.7 3.1 3.1 1.1 
Training 
< 24 months 17.0 18.5 47.6 4.1 1.3 3.3 1.6 0.1 
> 24 months 13.5 20.1 56.0 2.1 1.2 2.6 0.6 0.0 
Apprenticeship 
< 24 months 20.4 10.4 6.3 3.4 0.2 3.2 15.0 38.1 
> 24 months 14.3 9.8 31.0 3.0 0.4 2.5 8.6 25.7 
Total 27.2 17.5 19.6 5.6 0.9 4.0 8.0 4.3 
Notes: row percentages. Freelancers and self-employed not included since the firm code is not observed. A training 
contract cannot last more than 24 months in the same firm; it can be observed as a spell of 25 months for data 
construction reasons. 
Source: our computation on WHIP data. 
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Notes: 
                                                          
i Anecdotal evidence collected through interviews with human resource managers points to relatively short screening 
periods, of no longer than nine months, depending also on the occupation. 
ii In our experience, a random-effect multi-state multi-spell approach is also computationally more demanding, 
especially when the number of states considered is high. 
iii Honorè and Kyriazidou (2000) propose a solution to this problem. However, the conditions for the identification of 
the coefficients of time-varying characteristics (i.e., x(t) should be almost constant when the state changes) are too data-
demanding to be reasonable in our context. 
iv See the appendix for details. 
v By reducing the heterogeneity of the sample, we also make less severe any concern about the implicit homogeneity 
hypothesis across individuals of the transition parameters δ. Despite the relevance of the topic, the literature has not yet 
reached complete maturity (Browning and Carro, 2010). 
vi Unemployment benefit recipients are included in the "non-work" state, as inevitably also are employment spells in the 
black economy. 
vii Our analysis does not distinguish between part-time and full-time jobs. Robustness checks showed that the exclusion 
of part-time jobs is inconsequential on our results. 
viii We observe a minimal number of training contracts lasting 25 months, possibly driving up the estimation of 
persistence at two-year intervals; this is mainly for data construction reasons: starting and ending a 24-month contract 
during the same calendar month two years later is recorded as a 25-month spell in administrative data. 
ix The objection that employers are forced by law to retain at least 50% of the trainees is not relevant, since retention 
rate is well above 50% (see Table 3). 
x For an alternative reading of Table 8, one can interpret the rows as the labour market state in period t and the columns 
as the labour market state in period t+n, where n is one year in the upper panel and two years in the lower one. From 
this perspective, subrows (i.e., elapsed tenure) are informative about the labour market state in period t-n. In addition, 
one should also keep in mind that the data firm coding for freelancers is different from firm coding for employees, so 
we cannot observe whether freelancers become employees in the same or in a different firm; eventually, this distinction 
is not meaningful for the self-employed. 
xi Misconduct, but also firm restructuring or lack of demand. 
xii See Garibaldi et al. (2004) for details. 
xiii A limitation at 36 months at renewal (including previous fixed-term contracts with the same firm) has been 
introduced in 2007 and enforced from 2008.  
xiv For details on this contract see Ichino et al. (2008). The share of agency workers on total employed workforce is 
however still quite small, about 1%, and has remained stable throughout the period.  
xv The rebate differs according to regional unemployment rate, and has been decreased over time. See Contini et al. 
(2003) for details. 
